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Abstract
The internal rate of return to public investment in agri-
cultural R&D is estimated for each of the continental US 
states. Theoretically, our contribution provides a way of 
obtaining the returns to a local public good using Roth-
bart’s concept of virtual prices. Empirically, a stochastic 
cost function that includes own knowledge capital stock 
as well as spillover capital stock variables is estimated. 
Stochastic spatial dependency among states generated 
by knowledge spillovers is used to define the “appropri-
ate” jurisdictions. We estimate an average own-state rate 
of 17% and a social rate of 29% that compare well to the 
9 and 12% average returns of the S&P500 and NASDAQ 
composite indexes during the same period.
Keywords: Internal rates of return, Public R&D, Spillins, 
Spillovers, Local public goods, Appropriate jurisdiction, 
Spatial 
1. Introduction
Several studies report significant returns to pub-
lic investments in agricultural research and devel-
opment (R&D) in the United States by regions, com-
modities or at the national level.1 The existence of 
significant regional knowledge spillovers has led au-
thors to conclude that public agricultural R&D should 
be coordinated at regional or national levels. However, 
little evidence is available on the returns to agricultural 
R&D by state and, therefore, little guidance exists on 
where to invest taxpayers’ dollars to maximize agricul-
tural productivity.
The present study intends to contribute to the de-
bate by providing an assessment of the benefits from 
public investment in agricultural R&D for each con-
tinental US state, acknowledging in theory and em-
pirics their local public goods nature. This is the first 
study to endogenously recover the impact of public in-
vestments in agricultural R&D for each of the 48 con-
tinental US states while accounting for structural and 
stochastic dependency among the states due to knowl-
edge spillovers.2 The assessment is conducted in terms 
of the Internal Rate of Return3 (IRR): the greater is the 
IRR for one state, ceteris paribus, the more socially de-
sirable it is to invest in public agricultural R&D in that 
state. Any responsible policy discussion about the dis-
position of public funds should be based on knowl-
edge of the returns to such investment. We provide the 
estimates of the IRR to public investments in agricul-
tural R&D for each US state hoping in this way to con-
tribute to the policy debate.
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1. For a review of the economic impacts of agricultural R&D at sectoral and aggregate levels both for the US and other countries, 
see Evenson (2001), Alston et al. (2000), Alston (2002), Huffman and Evenson (2006).
2. Khanna et al. (1994) analyzed the optimal allocation of public monies to agricultural R&D in the same 48 US states considered 
in the present study with a joint production model of public and state-specific benefits. Spillovers were defined as contempo-
rary expenditures on R&D in neighboring states, and state expenditures on R&D were endogenous to their formulation.
3. The IRR is the rate of return that equals the discounted stream of benefits from an investment with its initial cost.
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In addition, we contribute to the literature by pro-
viding a general theory and a way of measuring the 
returns to a local public good using the concept of 
virtual prices.4 In assessing the benefits of public agri-
cultural R&D, it is crucial to recognize its local public 
goods nature. Since there is no market for trading pub-
lic goods, no market assessment of the value of public 
goods is readily available, and their value must be re-
covered endogenously. In addition, a local public good 
needs a definition of its ‘appropriate’ jurisdiction. While 
some research results are fully usable only by the juris-
diction that the research was intended for some are also 
usable by other jurisdictions, giving rise to knowledge 
spillovers.5 Therefore, the major challenges for the re-
searcher are: to estimate the returns to this public good 
and to do so by attributing the benefits from an invest-
ment in R&D to the ‘appropriate’ jurisdiction. Latimer 
and Paarlberg (1965) and Evenson (1967) have early in-
dicated the potential distortion in the estimates of the 
contribution of public R&D to the agricultural sector 
due to the presence of spillovers.6 It is in this sense that 
the researcher must define the jurisdiction under anal-
ysis. In this study, the benefits from an investment in 
R&D are estimated from the impacts of such investment 
on the production structure for two different levels of 
aggregation: the state where the investment was under-
taken (the own state benefits), and the state and other 
states in its ‘jurisdiction’ (the social benefits).7 
The researcher then must address the problems in es-
timation of the benefits of R&D, not only for the own 
state, but for all other states affected by the existence of 
spillover effects across them. Most of the studies on the 
effects of R&D are ad-hoc. They include primal and dual 
approaches in which a variable representing the stock 
of own state R&D is included in a production function, 
cost function or on a two step regression of a productiv-
ity index to capture the own state benefits. Some stud-
ies add an ad-hoc spill-in variable to capture the social 
benefits and to avoid the structural dependence prob-
lem among states due to the local public goods nature 
of the investment. But it is possible that knowledge gen-
erated in one state might benefit other states beyond 
the geographical limits imposed ad-hoc by researchers 
when defining the spill-in stocks. If this is the case, the 
residuals of the estimating model will contain relevant 
information and will be correlated among geographical 
units, generating cross-sectional stochastic dependence.
A distinctive feature of this article is that the aggre-
gate technology is represented by a stochastic variable 
cost function with knowledge capital stock (research) 
variables and a stochastic spatial error structure. The 
own-state stock of public R&D enters this function as a 
fixed input of production. A spill-in variable is also ex-
plicitly incorporated into the model to account for struc-
tural dependency among “similar” states due to knowl-
edge spill-ins. Following Fulginiti and Perrin (1993) 
and Onofri and Fulginiti (2008) and using the deriva-
tive property of the cost function we recover the virtual 
prices for own-state public R&D and spill-in knowledge 
stocks. Parameters of such a model are then used in the 
calculation of IRRs. These IRRs then will include own 
state plus spill-in impacts of the R&D investment. In ad-
dition to incorporating knowledge stock spill-ins in the 
structure of the cost function, we allow in estimation for 
the existence of stochastic spatial dependency in the er-
ror term to adjust the estimates by the extent of propa-
gation across states not captured structurally. A model 
with spatial autocorrelation (SAR) in the error structure 
is estimated with US state-level annual data for the pe-
riod 1949–1991 (Craig et al. 2002) using generalized spa-
tial three stage least squares (Keleijian and Prucha 2004). 
The resulting estimates from the spatial model are com-
pared to the estimates from a non-spatial model to as-
sess the impact of stochastic spatial dependency on 
estimated IRRs. We expect that failing to correct for sto-
chastic spatial dependency induced by knowledge spill-
overs would affect the definition of the appropriate ju-
risdiction and the magnitude of returns to R&D.
The estimates of the IRR to public agricultural R&D 
are positive and significant for all states. The average 
own state IRR for the nation is estimated, in the spa-
tial model, at 17%, while the average social IRR is esti-
mated at 29%. In the non-spatial model these estimates 
are 12 and 14% higher, respectively. The returns esti-
mated are fairly high, even though correcting for sto-
chastic spill-ins in public agricultural research has re-
sulted in lower IRRs.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section 
the economic model used to capture the virtual prices of 
a local public good is presented. It is shown then how 
4. A virtual price, introduced originally in demand theory by Rothbart (1941), is the price at which the consumer/producer, acting 
as a price taker, will choose to consume a specified bundle.
5. As mentioned by a reviewer, there are many examples of knowledge spillovers, like formula-based public research committed 
to, for example, Michigan’s experiment station to study poultry diseases intended to benefit local poultry producers that benefit 
producers in Delaware, North Carolina, and other poultry producing states as well.
6. White and Havlicek (1979) showed that failure to take into account geographical spillovers from US regional agricultural re-
search inflated the estimated rate of return to R&D in the Southern region by more than 25%.
7. Huffman et al. (2002) estimated the own state IRR to public expenditures on agricultural R&D for the “representative” Mid-
western state to be 11% per annum, and a social rate of return of 43% per annum. Yee et al. (2002) estimated the social rate of re-
turn to public agricultural research to be about 3.5–6.7 times the own state rate of return for the “representative” state in each of 
the seven regions defined in their study. Huffman and Evenson (2006) estimated regional social IRRs to range from 49 to 62%.
Rates  of  return to public  agricultural research in 4 8  US states   97
these virtual prices are incorporated into the calculation 
of the own state and the social IRRs and how the “ap-
propriate jurisdictions” are determined. The data used 
and the estimation procedure are described next, fol-
lowed by a description of the results. A summary of the 
findings and their relevance is provided in the conclud-
ing section.
2. The model
The unit of analysis, determined by the level of aggre-
gation of the available data, is the state. We assume that 
each state produces an aggregate output, y, using vari-
able inputs x = x1,…,xN, fixed private inputs v = v1,…
,vM, and fixed public inputs V = V1,…,VQ. The vector of 
prices of the variable inputs is denoted by w = w1,…,wN, 
with w · x = ∑N
n=1
wnxn. Let y = f(x, v, V) be the produc-
tion function satisfying monotonicity and weak essenti-
ality in x. Let B(y, v, V) = {x: f(x, v, V) ≥ y} be the closed, 
non-empty and convex restricted input requirement set 
to produce output y. Then, a well-defined non-nega-
tive short-run variable cost function c(w, y, v, V) exists 
which is non-decreasing, concave, continuous and pos-
itively linearly homogeneous in w, and non-decreasing 
in y (Chambers 1988):
(1)
Furthermore, if c(w, y, v, V) is differentiable in w, it also 
satisfies Shephard’s lemma in w:
(2)
where x is the vector of cost-minimizing variable input 
demands, homogeneous of degree zero in w and with 
symmetric and negative semi-definite matrix wx = ∇ww 
c(w, y, v, V). If c(w, y, v, V) is differentiable in v and V, 
Shephard’s lemma can be applied to fixed factors. For 
convenience, c(w, y, v, V) is assumed twice continuously 
differentiable in all its arguments. The monetary value 
placed by producers on marginal units of private fixed 
factors v, hereon referred to as the shadow value or vir-
tual price Zv , is represented by the amount of variable 
cost saved in the production of y due to the availability 
of an extra unit of v:
(3)
In the short-run, Zv can be positive or negative, depend-
ing on the level of the private fixed factor with respect 
to its long-run optimum and on its disposability as-
sumption. If the level of the private fixed factor is below 
its long-run optimum, the variable cost function is ex-
pected to be decreasing in v (i.e., Zv  > 0) since the set of 
feasible combinations of (x, v, V) increases when an ex-
tra unit of v is available for production, so that new cost-
minimizing opportunities (previously unavailable) are 
opened up (Chambers 1988, p. 102).8 If the private fixed 
factor is above its long-run optimum and it is freely dis-
posable (i.e., it does not cost anything in terms of output 
or other inputs to get rid of the extra units above the op-
timal level), then the variable cost function is expected 
to be independent of v (i.e., Zv   =  0). However, if the 
private fixed factor is above its long-run optimum but 
it is not freely disposable (i.e., it is costly to dispose off 
the extra units), its shadow value is expected to take a 
negative sign (i.e., Zv  < 0), indicating that an extra unit 
of the private fixed factor might actually increase short-
run variable costs. Since we make no a priori assumption 
about the free disposability of private fixed inputs or 
their level with respect to their long-run optimum, we 
do not expect any particular sign for Zv .
The monetary value placed by producers on mar-
ginal units of public factors V, hereon referred to as the 
shadow value or virtual price ZV , is represented by the 
amount of variable cost saved in the production of y due 
to the availability of an extra unit of V:
(4)
Similar to the shadow values of private fixed factors, the 
shadow values of public factors can be positive or neg-
ative, depending on their free disposability. While some 
public inputs might be freely disposable, (e.g. public 
roads that producers might choose not to use), some 
others are not (e.g. pollution). Since we make no a priori 
assumption about the free disposability of public inputs, 
we do not expect any particular sign for ZV . If ZV  ≥ 0, an 
extra unit of the public factor generates short-run sav-
ings to agricultural producers; while if ZV  < 0 it might 
actually increase short-run variable costs.9 
Local public goods are provided to satisfy the needs 
of a certain group of economic agents in a specific juris-
diction. In particular, local public knowledge on agricul-
tural sciences generated for a specific state i, Gi , is de-
veloped to satisfy the needs of producers in that state. 
Therefore, it is completely usable by local producers 
and is incorporated as a public fixed input of produc-
tion in the present model. However, that same knowl-
8. In primal space, Zv  ≥ 0 implies that the marginal product of an extra unit of the private fixed factor v is positive when the mar-
ginal cost of producing an extra unit of output is positive; i.e.,  Zv  = –∂ */∂v = (∂ */∂y) (∂y/∂v) ≥ 0  ⇔ (∂y/∂v) ≥ 0, where  * is the 
Lagrange function corresponding to Equation (1) evaluated at the optimal x values, (∂ */∂y) is the reciprocal marginal cost of an 
extra unit of output, and (∂y/∂v) is the marginal product of the private fixed factor v.
9. Since the second order gradients of the variable cost with respect to private and public fixed inputs — ∇vvc(·),∇vVc(·), and 
∇VVc(·) — characterize the rate of change of their shadow values, and no assumption was made on the sign of their shadow val-
ues, no assumption is made on the rates of change.
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edge might also be used by producers in other states af-
ter some adjustments to (different) local conditions. The 
stock of knowledge spill-outs from state i to state j (i ≠ i), 
Sji , is the share of the stock of knowledge generated in 
state i, Gi , usable by producers in state j:
(5)
where αji  represents the degree of usability of knowl-
edge from state i in state j, and 0 ≤ αji  < 1. Therefore, the 
aggregate stock of spill-ins from neighboring states (in-
dexed by j) to state i is defined as:
(6)
and the vector of the stocks of public fixed inputs avail-
able to producers in state i is:
(7)
The shadow value of the own state stock of public R&D 
in state i, ZGi , can now be expressed as:
(8)
and the shadow value of the stock of public R&D from a 
neighboring state j, ZSij , as:
(9)
where the second equality holds by construction of 
the stock of knowledge spill-outs from state j to state i 
(Equation 5). These two concepts, obtained from the the-
oretical model, are used below in the calculation of the 
own state and the social IRRs of public investments.
The internal rate of return to public outlays in agri-
cultural R&D is the discount rate that makes the dis-
counted stream of benefits during m periods stem-
ming from an increase in public investments in R&D in 
a given state i at time t0, equal to its initial cost. The ini-
tial cost is the extra investment at time t0, convention-
ally represented in discrete terms in the corporate fi-
nance literature as a negative amount, ∆Ri,t0< 0. In the 
present analysis, the stream of benefits for the state that 
conducted the R&D activities, state i, are the reductions 
in the cost of agricultural production in successive peri-
ods (−∆ci,t) derived from the increased stock of publicly 
available knowledge (∆Gi,t) generated by the investment 
in R&D in t0. Therefore, the own state internal rate of re-
turn is the rate r that solves the following program:
(10)
Note that −∆ci,t/∆Gi,t  corresponds to the concept of 
ZGi , as defined in Equation (8). Therefore, Equation (10) 
can be re-expressed as:
(11)
and a necessary condition for r to exist is that the 
shadow value of Gi  be positive for at least one period, 
i.e., ZGi,t0+q > 0 for some q > 0. However, as long as the 
knowledge generated by one state i is free and usable by 
producers in other j states, the concept of total benefits 
from an increase in public investments in R&D in state 
i at time t0 might be expanded to also include the spill-
overs of that investment, i.e. the reductions in the cost 
of agricultural production in the other j states. The social 
internal rate of return is the rate r1 that solves the fol-
lowing program:
(12)
Note that −∆cj,t ∆Sj,t /∆Sj,t ∆Gi,t  corresponds to the con-
cept of the shadow value to state j of an increase in the 
stock of knowledge in state i, ZSji  as defined in Equation 
(9). Equation (12) can be re-expressed in terms of virtual 
prices as:
(13)
The variable Gi is constructed as a weighted sum of pre-
vious expenditures on public agricultural R&D in state i 
(Ri ), with the weights following an inverted V-pattern.10 
(14)
Given that the αij ’s are not observable, the variable 
Si  is constructed as the direct sum of the stocks of Gj ’s 
conducted in other states (j ≠ i):11 
(15)
and the imperfect usability nature of knowledge gener-
ated in other states is incorporated structurally into the 
analysis through interaction terms (rather than S being 
treated as another fixed input like G or T) in the variable 
10. A complete description on construction of Gi is given in the following section.
11. A complete description of Si  is given in the following section.
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cost chosen. The following translog cost function is hy-
pothesized to be stable over the period 1949–1991:
(16)
where i indexes states (i  =  1, 2, …, 48). In this study, 
labor (L), purchased inputs (M), and capital (K) are 
treated as variable inputs, while land (T) is consid-
ered a private fixed input. Note that the stock of spill-
ins is treated differently than the own-state stock 
of R&D: while G is fully usable by the state and is 
treated similarly to the private fixed factor T, S is only 
partially usable and enters the variable cost through 
interaction terms.
In addition, since agricultural production is sen-
sitive to the geoclimatic characteristics (soil type, hu-
midity, etc.) of the area in which it is conducted, farms 
in different locations might use different technologies 
of production, this being another source of structural 
spatial heterogeneity across states (Anselin 1998). This 
translog function incorporates fixed state effects, rep-
resented by the dummy variables DUMj  that capture, 
structurally, the unobservable characteristics of each 
state that influence local agricultural production. Note 
that these parameters are interacted with input prices 
in their levels to allow for fixed effects in the derived 
input demands. In addition to the inclusion of terms in 
the specification of the cost function to capture struc-
tural differences and interactions across states, this 
study allows stochastic spatial interaction with the 
purpose of using information that might not be cap-
tured structurally.
For each state i, the three private input share equa-
tions (n  =  M, K, L), the virtual share of the private fixed 
input T, and the virtual shares of the public fixed inputs 
G and S implied by (16) are derived using Shephard’s 






Equations (18), (19), and (20) are, respectively, the elas-
ticity of cost with respect to land, the elasticity of cost 
with respect to the own state stock of public agricultural 
R&D, and the elasticity of cost with respect to the stock 
of spill-ins from public agricultural R&D conducted in 
neighboring states. These elasticities can be either pos-
itive or negative, depending on the free disposability 
of the fixed inputs and their levels with respect to their 
long-run optimum.
In order to estimate the own state IRR to public expen-
ditures on agricultural R&D, (11) can be conveniently 
expressed as the discounted sum of the shadow values 
of Gi  over time weighted by the research expenditure 
weights used to construct the stocks of public agricul-
tural R&D from Equation (14)
(21)
where Bi,t = ϖt ZGi,t  is a direct measure of the own state 
monetary benefits at t from an extra dollar invested in 
public agricultural R&D at t0. We use Equation (19) with 
ϖt0 = 0 to evaluate Equation (21) and obtain the own 
state IRR to investment in public agricultural R&D in 
each of the 48 states.
Similarly, using Equations (13), (14), and (15), the so-
cial IRR r1 can be expressed as:
(22)
100 Plastina &  Fulginiti  in  Journal  of  Productivity  Analys is  3 7  ( 2 0 1 2 ) 
where Fi,t  is the social shadow value of Gi  at time t; and 
B*i,t = ϖt Fi,t measures social monetary benefits at time t 
from an extra dollar invested in public agricultural 
R&D in state i at t0. We use Equations (19) and (20) to 
estimate r1.
If ZSi  ≥ 0 then r1 ≥ r, indicating that the total benefits 
of R&D are at least as big as the benefits that accrue only 
to the state where the expenses were incurred.
3. Data
The agricultural production variables for all 48 states for 
the period 1949–1991 are from Craig et al. (2002).12 Ac-
cording to Acquaye et al. (2003) this data set “was de-
veloped with a view in particular to measuring the ef-
fects of public agricultural R&D on productivity” and 
it included Fisher Ideal quantity indexes for the flows 
of agricultural output, labor, purchased inputs, capital 
and land, expenditures on land, labor, purchased inputs 
and capital, and the value of total agricultural output for 
each state (see “Appendix 1”). The variable cost in this 
study is the sum of expenditures on labor, purchased in-
puts and capital for farm production in constant 1949 
dollars.13 In order to reflect the differences in the rela-
tive sizes of the agricultural sector across states, we mul-
tiplied quantity indexes for land and output by their re-
spective expenditures in 1949.14 
The own-state R&D stock G was constructed as a 
31-years weighted average of gross public expenditures 
on agricultural R&D at state level in constant US dollars, 
according to (14).15 As in McCunn and Huffman (2000), 
the reason for using political rather than geoclimatic 
borders is our focus on public funding, which is based 
on political borders. The weights ϖ t are constructed by 
transforming Chavas and Cox’s (1992) estimated mar-
ginal effects of public research expenditures on US agri-
cultural productivity, CCt, to add up to one:
(23)
The weights follow an inverted-V distribution of the 
lags of the effects of R&D on productivity through time 
implying a gestation period of 7 years, followed by an 
8 years period of increasing effects at a low rate, and an-
other 8 years period of increasing effects at a higher rate, 
reaching a maximum in year twenty-three, and declining 
to zero from there onwards by year thirty-one.16 These es-
timates are appealing because they were obtained using 
non-parametric methods, avoiding strong distributional 
assumptions required in parametric estimation.17 Gross 
12. This data set is available at http://www.apec.umn.edu/faculty/ppardey/data.html , and was used in Acquaye et al. (2003). This 
data set has been revised and extended over 1949–2002 (Pardey et al. 2007), but was not publicly available. Comparing the de-
scriptive statistics of the newer series from Table 1 in Andersen et al. (2007) to the older series, capital seems to have been re-
vised downwards (the mean, the minimum and the maximum values are about 5% lower in the newer data set than in the 
older one, while the standard deviation is only 1.5% higher). The output series also seems to have suffered significant revision: 
the minimum value is 24% lower and the standard deviation is 19% higher in the newer data set, while the mean is only 1.6% 
higher. We did not use the 1960–1993 data set from O’Donnel et al. (1999) because it was revised and modified after 1993. Alter-
natively we could have used the data developed by ERS (1998) to obtain indexes of productivity by state for 1960–1996 or the re-
vised version used in Ball et al. (2001). But the state-level expenditures on agricultural inputs used in the construction of their 
quantity indexes needed for our estimation were not available to us.
13. We obtained the series of expenditures in purchased inputs, capital and labor in constant 1949 dollars by multiplying the 
Fisher Ideal input quantity indexes (1949  =  100) by the expenditures in each input in 1949. Following standard indexing proce-
dures when quantity indexes take the value of 100 in 1949 the expenditures in that year are used as proxies for prices. Accord-
ing to Acquaye et al. (2003), data for labor comprise 30 farm operator classes (five age and six education characteristics), fam-
ily labor, and hired labor. Data for purchased inputs involve pesticides, fertilizers, fuel, seed, feed, repairs, machine hire, and 
miscellaneous expenses. Capital involves buildings and structures, automobiles (units not for personal use), trucks, pickers and 
balers, mowers and conditioners, tractors, combines, dairy cattle, breeder pigs, sheep and cows, and chickens (not broilers).
14. Land comprises cropland, irrigated cropland, and grassland, pasture, range and grazed forest. Agricultural output aggregates 
field crops, fruits and nuts, vegetables and livestock.
15. Evenson (1989), Huffman and Evenson (1989, 1992, 1993, 2001), and Khanna et al. (1994) have constructed and used R&D 
stocks for US states but these data sets have not been made public. We proceed to build our own for the purpose of this study. 
The mean of G in our study closely resembles the mean of Huffman and Evenson’s “public agricultural research capital for an 
originating state”: $1.73 million in 1949 dollars or $10.1 million in 1986 dollars. The mean of S in our study is lower than the 
mean of Huffman and Evenson’s “public agricultural research capital spillin”:  $7.65 million versus $8.86 million in 1949 dol-
lars, or $44.7 million versus $51.8 million in 1986 dollars. We were unable to compare the distribution of our variables to theirs. 
This is true for variables G and S in our study.
16. Different studies adopt different weight structures: inverted-V form (Evenson 1967), second order polynomial (Knutson and 
Tweeten 1979) or trapezoidal (Huffman and Evenson 1989).
17. We realize that the marginal effects of public agricultural research expenditure on agricultural productivity might be endogenous 
to each state and are likely to differ among states. But given that no publicly available study estimates the marginal effects for each 
state, we use a set of estimated marginal effects at the national aggregate to compute the R&D stocks. While some early studies used 
10- or 20-years lags (Evenson 1967; Knutson and Tweeten 1979; White and Havlicek 1979), more recent studies suggest that in or-
der to properly capture the benefits of investment in research on agricultural production, lags of at least 30 years must be used in the 
construction of the stocks (Pardey and Craig 1989; Schimmelpfennig and Thirtle 1994; Alston et al. 1998; Alston and Pardey 2001).
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public expenditures include all USDA appropriations, 
CSREES administered funds, state appropriations, and 
other federal and non-federal funds for State Agricul-
tural Experiment Stations (SAES) and 1890 Institutions.18 
Data on total public agricultural R&D expenditures at the 
state level in current US dollars were obtained from the 
Current Research Information System Database (CRIS) 
for the period 1970–1991. Given the long lags assumed to 
construct the stock, data is needed for earlier periods and 
for the years 1919–1969, we have data only for agricul-
tural R&D expenditures at SAES. These were collected, in 
current dollars, from several USDA reports. These series 
were used to construct a proxy for total agricultural R&D 
expenditures at the state level for the years 1919–1969 us-
ing the average ratio of total to SAES agricultural R&D 
expenditures in 1970–1980 and extrapolating to 1919.19 
An agricultural R&D price index was constructed for the 
period 1919–1999 from Huffman and Evenson (1993)and 
USDA data, which was used to express the expenditure 
series in constant 1949 dollars.20 
The spill-in variable S is constructed as the sum of 
the stocks of public agricultural R&D of the states that 
share common borders or vertices with the state un-
der analysis, indexed by j and i, respectively, in Equa-
tion (6). Similar geographical proximity criteria to con-
struct spillover variables have previously been used by 
Khanna et al. (1994), Huffman et al. (2002), and Yee et al. 
(2002) to reflect similarities in climatic conditions, pro-
duction conditions, input–output mixes, etc., among the 
states under analysis. In the present study, S captures 
the effects of structural spill-ins from R&D conducted in 
neighboring states. For example, S for Nebraska consists 
of the sum of the stocks of R&D in Wyoming, South Da-
kota, Iowa, Missouri, Kansas and Colorado.21 
4. Estimation and results
This section is organized as follows. Two versions of the 
model consisting of the cost function and the capital and 
purchased inputs shares, Equations (16) and (17), are 
estimated maintaining symmetry and linear homoge-
neity in prices. Model 1 assumes that the spill-in vari-
able S captures all relevant knowledge spillovers across 
states, i.e. it models structural spatial dependency. To 
test for the existence of stochastic effects of knowledge 
spillovers beyond the structural effects captured by S, 
a modified version of the Keleijian and Robinson (1992) 
test is performed on the residuals of Model 1. This test 
provides an assessment of the extent of the propaga-
tion of spillovers not captured by the variable S, and of 
the impact of any event that affects adjacent states and 
is not captured in the structure of the model. It indi-
cates the necessity to acknowledge and model stochastic 
spatial dependency. Model 2 is estimated using three-
stage generalized spatial least squares (3SGSLS) to cor-
rect for the stochastic effects. Results from Model 2 are 
then compared to those from Model 1 to assess the effect 
of failing to account for stochastic dependency among 
states. The best model is selected on the basis of the 
McElroy System R2 and the Akaike Information Crite-
rion (AIC) for each equation.22 
The variable cost and the purchased inputs and capi-
tal shares in Model 1 are estimated using iterative seem-
ingly unrelated least squares (ITSUR in version SAS 9.1). 
The share of labor has been dropped from the estima-
tion to avoid singularity of the estimation matrix and its 
parameters recovered using the set of restrictions im-
posed. One hundred and seventy-four parameters are 
estimated with 6,192 observations (three stacked equa-
tions and 43 years for each of the 48 states.)
The model fits the data reasonably well, with a sys-
tem R2 of 0.896 and adjusted R2 for each estimating 
equation greater than 0.8. These parameters conform 
to symmetry and homogeneity as these properties have 
been imposed in estimation. The Hessian is negative 
semi-definite at the mean of the data for each state im-
plying concavity of the cost in prices at the mean of the 
data. The cost function is non-decreasing in output as 
the marginal cost evaluated at the mean of the data is 
positive for all states. Parameter estimates are reported 
in “Appendix 2”.
Given that our main objective is the estimation of re-
turns to local public inputs and the calculation of the 
implied IRR for public R&D investments we focus on 
these estimates. The effects of public inputs on the de-
mand for private variable inputs are computed from 
18. USDA appropriations for the Forest Service, the McIntire-Stennis Act from the CSREES Administered Funds, and all funds for 
Forestry Schools are excluded. USDA’s intramural research is not included in the current analysis, since it is not possible to as-
sign benefits to particular states, and the focus of this study is to estimate the IRR to agricultural R&D conducted at the state 
level. Extension is also excluded from the current analysis due to lack of data.
19. A similar methodology has been applied by Khanna et al. (1994) and Yee et al. (2002).
20. The concept of deflated total public agricultural R&D expenditures in this study resembles that of total public expenditures 
on agricultural research used by Khanna et al. (1994). The main difference is that forestry funds are excluded from the present 
study. We have not been able to do a numerical comparison as their data is not publicly available.
21. We also experimented with another pattern of technological similarity across states by applying cluster analysis techniques 
to the states’ agricultural output-mix, and the results were highly dependent on the method used (single linkage, average link-
age or centroid) and the criteria used to define the optimal number of clusters (hierarchical tree diagram, pseudo F statistic or 
pseudo Hotteling’s T 2 test statistic).
22. The McElroy System R2 is a weighted average of the R2 for each equation in the system, and is bounded to the 0–1 interval 
(Greene 2003, p. 345).
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Equations (19) and (20).23 The effects of G and S on pur-
chased inputs and labor are statistically significant for 
all states, but their effects on capital are not. An increase 
in G or in S generates an increase in the demand for pur-
chased inputs and a decrease in the demand for labor, 
suggesting that technical change induced by public ag-
ricultural R&D has been biased towards the use of pur-
chased inputs and against the use of labor in all states.24 
The most important estimates for our purpose are the 
estimates of the shadow prices for public inputs G and 
S as they enter directly the calculation of the IRRs. The 
shadow price of the own state stock of public agricul-
tural R&D as defined in Equations (4) and (19) is eval-
uated at the sample mean of all variables and for each 
state and it is reported in the second column of Table 1. 
Z‾G measures the amount of cost savings in the produc-
tion of output at constant 1949 dollars stemming from 
the public provision of an extra unit of G. Alternatively, 
Z‾G  measures producers’ willingness to pay for an extra 
unit of stock of public local agricultural R&D. For exam-
ple, the shadow value of G for Nebraska is, at the mean, 
$414.69, indicating that a $1 increase in the stock of pub-
lic agricultural R&D in Nebraska in a given year gener-
ated annual cost savings to agricultural producers of, on 
average, $414.69. The estimates of Z‾G are statistically sig-
nificant and positive for all states but California, Maine, 
and Maryland. As shown below, the fact that Z‾G  is not 
statistically different from zero for California, Maine, 
and Maryland is driven by the inability of Model 1 to 
incorporate the effects of stochastic spatial dependency, 
resulting in estimates with wide confidence intervals.25 
Note, however, that in the present study a $1 increase 
in the stock of public agricultural R&D in a given year 
requires a $1 investment in public agricultural R&D ac-
tivities during the previous 31 years. Therefore, the own 
state annual average monetary benefit from investing an 
extra dollar in public agricultural R&D in t0, is
(24)
where B refers to own state benefits as defined in Equa-
tion (21), and is a more intuitive measure of the benefits 
from R&D investments in agriculture (second column 
of Table 1). The 31-years annual average benefits vary 
from $0.63 for New York to $23.28 for Missouri for ev-
ery $1 invested (constant 1949 dollars), and the national 
simple average amounts to $7.63 with a standard devi-
ation among states of $5.43. The national weighted av-
erage of the own state benefits, with the weights being 
each state’s average share in total output, amounts to 
$8.22 and is significant at the 1% level. It must be em-
phasized, however, that given the distribution assumed 
in constructing the research stock variable, the impacts 
are assumed to be higher in the distant future than in 
the years immediately following the investment.
The average social shadow value of G,
(25)
where F is the social shadow value of research stocks de-
fined in Equation (22), and the average social monetary 
benefits from an extra dollar invested in agricultural 
R&D in t0,
(26)
where B* refers to social benefits as defined in Equation 
(22), are reported for each state in the last two columns 
of Table 1. Except for Maine, all estimates of F‾ are posi-
tive and significantly different from zero. As expected, 
F‾ is greater than Z‾G, implying a positive shadow value 
for research spillovers, ∑ j≠i ZSji. The implied annual av-
erage social benefits from R&D, in 1949 dollars, range 
from $3.79 (Rhode Island) to $90.09 (Missouri). The sim-
ple national average is $34.29 with a standard deviation 
across states of $20.78. The national weighted average 
of the social benefits, with the weights being each state’s 
average shares in total output, amounts to $40.44 and is 
significant at the 1% level.
The estimated average marginal IRR from own state 
investment in public agricultural R&D, rˆ, is obtained 
by plugging the estimate of Z‾G from Table 1 into Equa-
tion (21) and solving for r. Similarly, the estimated av-
erage marginal IRR from social investments in public 
agricultural R&D, rˆ1, is obtained by plugging the es-
timate of F‾ from Table 1 into Equation (22) and solv-
ing for r1. Ninety-five percent confidence intervals for rˆ 
and rˆ1 for each state are obtained by plugging the cor-
responding shadow values plus/minus two standard er-
rors in Equations (21) and (22), respectively (Table 2 and 
Figures 1 and 2). The simple average own state IRR for 
the nation is 26.9%, with a standard deviation of 8.91% 
across states. The weighted average own state IRR for 
the nation is 27.4%, and the 95% confidence interval is 
[26.2; 29.5%]. The highest own state IRR is 39% and cor-
23. Since private R&D expenditures are embodied in purchased inputs and capital, these effects should account, at least theoreti-
cally, for the interaction of public and private research. Our estimates also indicate that, at the mean of the data, land is a substi-
tute for purchased inputs and capital, and a complement for labor in all states.
24. Price elasticities evaluated at the mean of the data for each state indicate that own-price elasticities are negative, as expected. 
Cross-price elasticities for all inputs evaluated at the mean are positive, indicating that labor, purchased materials and capital 
are substitutes in production. Marginal cost elasticities evaluated at the mean of the data show 26 states with increasing returns 
to scale and 22 states with decreasing returns to scale.
25. The coefficients of variation are 107, 242 and 51% for California, Maine and Maryland respectively. Coefficient of variation 
=  standard error/|mean|.
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Table 1. Own state and social shadow values (Z, F) and benefits (B, B*) from agricultural R&D, no stochastic spatial dependency 
(Model 1, constant 1949 dollars)
State Z‾G  B‾ F‾   B‾* 
AL 226.42 (9.11) 7.30 (0.082) 759.57 (18.76) 24.5 (0.170)
AR 608.53 (27.48) 19.63 (0.249) 1,987.12 (49.99) 64.1 (0.452)
AZ 126.93 (5.08) 4.09 (0.046) 1,021.54 (33.09) 32.95 (0.299)
CA −15.9 (16.95)                             n/a 367.04 (19.40) 11.84 (0.176)
CO 214.5 (9.86) 6.92 (0.089) 1,747.31 (58.14) 56.36 (0.526)
CT 66.2 (4.77) 2.14 (0.043) 239.98 (11.49) 7.74 (0.104)
DE 193.1 (15.39) 6.23 (0.139) 386.26 (19.19) 12.46 (0.174)
FL 27.7 (6.81) 0.89 (0.062) 280.25 (13.14) 9.04 (0.119)
GA 173.03 (10.51) 5.58 (0.095) 882.39 (28.29) 28.46 (0.256)
IA 430.66 (28.19) 13.89 (0.255) 1,903.17 (64.29) 61.39 (0.582)
ID 275.95 (12.16) 8.90 (0.110) 1,204.72 (34.82) 38.86 (0.315)
IL 171.61 (13.23) 5.54 (0.120) 1,815.68 (59.57) 58.57 (0.539)
IN 275.7 (13.57) 8.89 (0.123) 1,179.57 (30.00) 38.05 (0.271)
KS 410.22 (23.86) 13.23 (0.216) 1,434.58 (44.22) 46.28 (0.400)
KY 311.79 (14.78) 10.06 (0.134) 1,906.61 (53.69) 61.5 (0.486)
LA 51.7 (5.42) 1.67 (0.049) 809.63 (24.97) 26.12 (0.226)
MA 118.5 (7.4) 3.82 (0.067) 315.37 (19.41) 10.17 (0.176)
MD −5.14 (2.64)                             n/a 374.39 (25.13) 12.08 (0.227)
ME −9.82 (23.74)                           n/a −29.03 (25.41)                               n/a
MI 298.21 (12.5) 9.62 (0.113) 1,552.31 (42.67) 50.07 (0.386)
MN 359.97 (23.12) 11.61 (0.209) 1,525.61 (51.36) 49.21 (0.465)
MO 675.1 (32.11) 21.78 (0.291) 2,792.67 (83.15) 90.09 (0.752)
MS 96.96 (7.5) 3.13 (0.068) 793.26 (24.36) 25.59 (0.220)
MT 148.62 (9.38) 4.79 (0.085) 891.18 (35.1) 28.75 (0.318)
NC 266.31 (16.07) 8.59 (0.145) 834.11 (27.11) 26.91 (0.245)
ND 128.96 (8.36) 4.16 (0.076) 811.07 (35.2) 26.16 (0.318)
NE 414.69 (22.71) 13.38 (0.205) 2,112.61 (79.8) 68.15 (0.722)
NH 105.79 (16.04) 3.41 (0.145) 255.01 (21.51) 8.23 (0.195)
NJ 65.93 (4.68) 2.13 (0.042) 296.8 (15.91) 9.57 (0.144)
NM 302.95 (14.2) 9.77 (0.128) 1,447.21 (38.23) 46.68 (0.346)
NV 172.85 (12.68) 5.58 (0.115) 1,076.17 (32.54) 34.72 (0.294)
NY 19.4 (6.97) 0.63 (0.063) 369.16 (26.59) 11.91 (0.241)
OH 241.41 (11.88) 7.79 (0.107) 1,196.53 (32.36) 38.60 (0.293)
OK 249.73 (9.25) 8.06 (0.084) 1,846.47 (66) 59.56 (0.597)
OR 130.88 (12.61) 4.22 (0.114) 859.55 (25.62) 27.73 (0.232)
PA 214.87 (11.47) 6.93 (0.104) 642.32 (25.75) 20.72 (0.233)
RI 32.83 (4.48) 1.06 (0.041) 117.54 (7.34) 3.79 (0.066)
SC 92.81 (7.99) 2.99 (0.072) 385.78 (15.08) 12.44 (0.136)
SD 721.77 (36.73) 23.28 (0.332) 2,275.57 (63.4) 73.41 (0.574)
TN 510.12 (21.14) 16.46 (0.191) 1,936.01 (48.88) 62.45 (0.442)
TX 113.32 (20.09) 3.66 (0.182) 764.04 (28.48) 24.65 (0.258)
UT 116.51 (12.18) 3.76 (0.110) 1,021.92 (35.42) 32.97 (0.320)
VA 343.09 (13.28) 11.07 (0.120) 938.1 (22.95) 30.26 (0.208)
VT 421.46 (24.33) 13.60 (0.220) 564.29 (25.78) 18.20 (0.233)
WA 44.95 (11.28) 1.45 (0.102) 408.34 (15.15) 13.17 (0.137)
WI 290.79 (13.65) 9.38 (0.123) 1,301.38 (35.79) 41.98 (0.324)
WV 210.93 (11.10) 6.80 (0.100) 829.04 (24.83) 26.74 (0.225)
WY 171.29 (12.15) 5.53 (0.110) 1,501.56 (56.36) 48.44 (0.510)
Simple national average 221.13 7.63 1,040.25 34.29
Simple national SD 173.72 5.43 656.54 20.78
Weighted national average 254.73 (16.85) 8.22 (0.15) 1,253.72 (41.10) 40.44 (0.37)
Approximated standard errors in parentheses; approximated standard errors obtained by the Delta method (Greene 2003).
n/a = not available
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responds to South Dakota. The simple average social 
IRR for the nation is 40%, with a standard deviation of 
8.38%. The weighted average social IRR for the nation is 
42.3%, and the 95% confidence interval is [41.7; 43.0%]. 
The highest social IRR is 51% and corresponds to Mis-
souri. In all states but Maine the social IRR is signifi-
cantly higher than the own state IRR, as indicated by the 
non-overlapping confidence intervals reported beside 
the IRR estimates in Table 2.
A modified version of the Keleijian and Robinson 
(KR) test for spatial autocorrelation in systems of equa-
tions, from Cohen and Morrison Paul (2007) is used on 
the errors of Model 1 to test for stochastic spatial depen-
dence across states. The KR test provides an estimate of 
the number of significant spatial lags in each equation. 
It is a large sample test based on the generalized method 
of moments (GMM) and it does not require the model 
to be linear, the disturbance terms to be normal, or the 
pattern of spatial correlation to be specified. The KR test 
requires an a priori choice of the neighboring states that 
might be spatially correlated, but it does not require 
knowledge of the spatial weights. A geographical pat-
tern of proximity among states is proposed as the driv-
ing force for spatial autocorrelation in the error struc-
ture. For each state, the US map is divided in concentric 
“rings” with the state under analysis as its center, the 
states that share a common border or intercept with the 
center as the first “ring” of neighboring states; the states 
that are detached from the center but share common 
borders or intercepts with the first “ring” as the second 
“ring” of neighboring states; and so on and so forth.26 
In this geographical partitioning of the space, states are 
expected to be more closely related to immediate neigh-
boring states than those farther away. The results from 
the KR test suggest that there exists stochastic spatial de-
pendency among states that are as much as four states 
apart from one another. This would be consistent with 
knowledge spillovers flowing widely across states and 
Table 2. Own state (r) and social (r1) IRRs (in percentage), no stochastic spatial effects (Model 1), 95% confidence intervals in 
square brackets
State  rˆ  rˆ1  State rˆ  rˆ1  State rˆ  rˆ1 
AL 30.08 [29.5; 30.6] 39.41 [39.0; 39.8] MD n/a [n/a,n/a] 33.78 [32.7; 34.7] OR 26.29 [24.9; 27.5] 40.45 [39.9; 40.9]
AR 37.58 [36.8; 38.3] 48.05 [47.6; 48.5] ME n/a [n/a; 18.5] n/a [n/a; 15.3] PA 29.7 [28.9; 30.4] 38.02 [37.3; 38.7]
AZ 26.08 [25.5; 26.6] 41.94 [41.4; 42.5] MI 32.07 [31.4; 32.7] 45.71 [45.2; 46.2] RI 17.65 [15.8; 19.1] 25.57 [24.7; 26.4]
CA n/a [n/a; 14.2] 33.63 [32.8; 34.4] MN 33.48 [32.4; 34.4] 45.54 [44.9; 46.2] SC 24.03 [22.8; 25.1] 34 [33.4; 34.6]
CO 29.69 [29.0; 30.3] 46.82 [46.2; 47.4] MO 38.43 [37.6; 39.2] 51.43 [50.8; 52.0] SD 38.98 [38.1; 39.8] 49.37 [48.8; 49.9]
CT 21.88 [20.9; 22.7] 30.49 [29.8; 31.2] MS 24.31 [23.2; 25.2] 39.77 [39.2; 40.3] TN 36.17 [35.5; 36.8] 47.8 [47.3; 48.3]
DE 28.95 [27.7; 30.0] 34.01 [33.2; 34.7] MT 27.14 [26.2; 28.0] 40.76 [40.1; 41.4] TX 25.33 [22.5; 27.4] 39.46 [38.8; 40.1]
FL 16.67 [12.9; 19.0] 31.62 [30.9; 32.3] NC 31.25 [30.3; 32.1] 40.2 [39.6; 40.7] UT 25.51 [24.0; 26.8] 41.94 [41.3; 42.5]
GA 28.19 [27.3; 29.0] 40.67 [40.1; 41.2] ND 26.19 [25.3; 27.0] 39.96 [39.2; 40.7] VA 33.12 [32.5; 33.7] 41.2 [40.8; 41.6]
IA 34.85 [33.8; 35.8] 47.63 [47.0; 48.3] NE 34.56 [33.7; 35.4] 48.64 [47.9; 49.4] VT 34.68 [33.7; 35.5] 36.98 [36.2; 37.7]
ID 31.5 [30.8; 32.1] 43.39 [42.9; 43.9] NH 24.88 [22.6; 26.6] 30.93 [29.6; 32.1] WA 19.51 [15.5; 22.0] 34.44 [33.9; 35]
IL 28.13 [27.0; 29.1] 47.18 [46.5; 47.8] NJ 21.86 [20.9; 22.7] 32.04 [31.2; 32.8] WI 31.89 [31.2; 32.6] 44.09 [43.6; 44.6]
IN 31.5 [30.7; 32.2] 43.21 [42.7; 43.6] NM 32.19 [31.5; 32.9] 45.06 [44.6; 45.5] WV 29.57 [28.8; 30.3] 40.14 [39.6; 40.6]
KS 34.47 [33.5; 35.3] 44.98 [44.4; 45.5] NV 28.18 [27.1; 29.1] 42.39 [41.8; 42.9] WY 28.12 [27.1; 29.0] 45.4 [44.7; 46.1]
KY 32.4 [31.7; 33.1] 47.65 [47.1; 48.2] NY 14.66 [8.0; 17.7] 33.67 [32.5; 34.7] SNA* 28.65 [25.7; 28.5] 39.84 [39.2; 40.8]
LA 20.36 [18.9; 21.5] 39.94 [39.4; 40.5] OH 30.54 [29.8; 31.2] 43.33 [42.8; 43.8] WNA* 27.37 [26.2; 29.5] 42.33 [41.7; 43.0]
MA 25.62 [24.7; 26.4] 32.49 [31.5; 33.4] OK 30.78 [30.2; 31.3] 47.34 [46.6; 48.0]   
n/a IRR can not be calculated since the corresponding shadow value is negative, SNA simple national average, WNA weighted national average. 
* The bounds of the confidence interval for the National Average are calculated as the average of the respective bounds for all states.
26. For example, Wyoming, South Dakota, Iowa, Missouri, Kansas and Colorado belong to the first “ring” of neighboring states 
for Nebraska; while New Mexico, Arizona, Utah, Idaho, Montana, North Dakota, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Illinois, Kentucky, 
Tennessee, Arkansas and Oklahoma form its second “ring” of neighboring states; Texas, California, Nevada, Oregon, Washing-
ton, Michigan, Indiana, Ohio, West Virginia, Virginia, North Carolina, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama and Georgia form its 
third “ring” of neighboring states.
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generating the spatial lag structures.27 The variable cost 
function, ln c, and the capital share, SHk , support a spa-
tial lag length of 5, while the share of purchased inputs, 
SHM , has a spatial lag of length 4.
To incorporate the effects of stochastic spatial depen-
dency in the estimation of the benefits from public ag-
ricultural R&D, Model 2 is estimated using the GS3SLS 
procedure proposed by Keleijian and Prucha (2004). The 
first stage corresponds to the estimation of Model 1. In 
the second stage, the residuals from Model 1 and the 
lag structure suggested by the KR test are used to esti-
mate the spatial autocorrelation parameters for each es-
timating equation using GMM. The estimates of the spa-
tial autocorrelation parameters (Table 3), which are all 
bounded to the unit circle, are used to perform a Co-
chrane-Orcutt-type transformation on the observed 
variables, in a similar fashion to the standard proce-
dure to correct for serial autocorrelation in time series. 
In the third stage, Model 2 determined by Equations 
(16) and (17) is re-estimated on the transformed vari-
ables with symmetry and linear homogeneity in prices 
maintained.28 
The share of labor has been dropped from the esti-
mation to avoid singularity as in estimation of Model 
1. One hundred and seventy-four parameters are esti-
mated with 6,192 observations (three stacked equations 
and 43 years for each of the 48 states) in Model 2. The 
system R2 for Model 2 (R2  =  0.911) is higher than the 
one from Model 1, and the AICs are lower for each es-
timating equation. Model 2 provides a better fit to the 
transformed data than Model 1 does to the untrans-
formed data. The estimated parameters conform to sym-
metry and homogeneity as these properties have been 
imposed in the estimation. The Hessian is negative 
semi-definite at the mean of the data for each state im-
plying concavity of the cost in prices at the mean of the 
data. The cost function is non-decreasing in output as 
the marginal cost evaluated at the mean of the data is 
positive for all states.29 The estimates from Model 2 and 
the associated goodness of fit measures are reported in 
“Appendix 3”.
The effects of G and S on the demand for variable in-
puts (measured as the elasticities of demand with re-
spect to the fixed public inputs) are all significant in 
Model 2. An increase in G or S generates an increase in 
the demand for purchased inputs and capital, and a de-
crease in the demand for labor, suggesting that techni-
cal change induced by public agricultural R&D has been 
biased towards the use of purchased inputs and capital 
and against labor.30, 31 
The own state shadow value of G, Z‾G, and the own 
state monetary benefits from an extra dollar invested in 
R&D in t0, B‾, are evaluated at the mean and reported for 
each state in the first two columns of Table 4. The esti-
mates of Z‾G are statistically significant and positive for 
all states.32 B‾ ranges from $0.05 in Oregon to $2.63 in 
Figure 1. Histogram of the own state IRR’s, (rˆ)—Model 1 Figure 2. Histogram of the social IRR’s, (rˆ1)—Model 1
27. We cannot discard the possibility of other variables not included in the model structure, like weather for example, adding to 
this dependency. In any case IRRs should be corrected if spatial dependency is present no matter what the source.
28. Plastina and Fulginiti (2007) provide a more detailed description of the GMM estimator of the spatial lags, along with descrip-
tive statistics, elasticity estimates and concavity results by states not included here due to space limitations.
29. The marginal cost elasticities evaluated at the mean of the variables indicate increasing returns to scale for all states, satisfying 
one of the necessary conditions for endogenous growth (Onofri and Fulginiti). A second condition, namely that of non-negative 
returns to public inputs, is also satisfied as the estimates of the shadows for public R&D in Table 4 show.
30. Land is a substitute for purchased inputs and capital, and a complement of labor.
31. For all states, the own-price elasticities are negative, as expected, and the cross-price elasticities for all inputs are positive, indi-
cating that labor, purchased materials and capital are substitutes.
32. The coefficients of variation for California, and Maine are now significantly lower than in Model 1 (55, and 18%, respectively), 
while the coefficient of variation for Maryland is higher (77%).
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Maine and the simple national average is $0.94, while 
the weighted national average is $1.02 and is statisti-
cally significant at the 1% level (constant 1949 dollars). 
The estimates of own state benefits are now significantly 
lower than the own state benefits obtained in Model 1.
The social shadow value of public agricultural R&D, 
F‾, and the social monetary benefits from an extra dol-
lar invested in R&D in t0, B‾*, are evaluated at the mean 
and reported for each state in the last two columns of 
Table 4. All social shadows are non-negative and signif-
icantly different from zero. Social shadows are higher 
than own state shadow values for public agricultural 
R&D stocks (estimates of  F‾ are greater than Z‾G), imply-
ing a positive shadow value for spillouts, ∑
j≠i
ZSji. Social 
benefits,  B‾*, range from $0.33 in Rhode Island to $18.46 
in Missouri, with a simple national average of $6.39 
(constant 1949 dollars) and a weighted national average 
of $7.98, significant at the 1% level. As mentioned be-
fore, benefits from the investment have a higher impact 
in the distant future than in the years immediately fol-
lowing the investment in R&D.
The estimated own state (rˆ) and social (rˆ 1) IRRs con-
sistent with Model 2 for each state are reported in Ta-
ble 5 and Figures 3–6, along with their 95% confidence 
intervals. The highest average own state IRR corre-
sponds to Maine and equals 23.18%, while the lowest 
corresponds to Oregon and equals 2%. The simple aver-
age own state IRR for the nation is 16% with a standard 
deviation across states of 4.51%. The weighted average 
own state IRR for the nation is 16.5%, with a 95% con-
fidence interval ranging from 8.6 to 19.8%. In all states 
but California, Maryland and Maine (states where the 
own state IRR could not be estimated in Model 1), the 
own state IRR from Model 2 is significantly lower than 
that from Model 1.33 
These estimates are consistent with the estimates of 
returns to investments in public agricultural R&D and 
extension by Lu et al. (1979) (25%), White and Havlicek 
(7–36%), Evenson (11–45%), Oehmke (1996) (11.6%), 
and Alston, Craig and Pardey (7–31%). However, they 
are significantly lower than the rates estimated in most 
other studies. Evenson (2001) reports IRRs to aggregate 
public sector agricultural research (not including exten-
sion) from several studies ranging from 25 to 212%.
The social IRRs from Model 2 range from 11.26% in 
Rhode Island to 37.09% in Missouri. The simple national 
average is 27% and its standard deviation across states is 
6.56%. The weighted national average is 29.3%, and the 
95% confidence interval is [26.5; 31.1%]. The social IRRs 
are lower in Model 2 than in Model 1 for all states except 
for Maine (state for which the social IRR could not be cal-
culated in Model 1). These are significant differences as 
indicated by the non-overlapping confidence intervals. 
The social IRRs obtained from Model 1 are, on average, 
14% higher than the ones estimated with Model 2.
Our estimates of the social IRRs, once correction has 
been made for stochastic spatial dependency, even 
though impressive relative to market returns of private 
investments, are significantly lower than those calcu-
lated by Evenson (1989), Huffman and Evenson (1993, 
2006), and Yee et al. (2002). These authors estimate rates 
between 49 and 600%.
Huffman et al. (2002) obtain estimates for the Mid-
western states. For comparison purposes we calculate a 
simple average and a weighted average of our estimates 
for the states of Minnesota, Iowa, Illinois, Missouri, and 
Indiana. The simple and weighted average own state 
IRRs for the Midwestern states, 18 and 17.32%34 respec-
tively, are higher than the 11% in their study. Our simple 
and weighted social IRR for the Midwestern states are ap-
proximately 33%35—figures that are lower than the “sig-
nificantly higher than 40%” reported in their paper.36 
Although the analysis of the patterns of these rates 
across states is not the objective of this paper, we note 
here some interesting relationships. The ten states with 
lower spillover effects are concentrated in the Northeast 
of the country, and include Rhode Island, Maine, Con-
necticut, Delaware Vermont, Massachusetts, New Jersey, 
New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, and New York. These 
states’ average own IRRs is 16%, equal to the average for 
all states but their spillovers are very low, with an aver-
age rate of 0.8%. This result is consistent with the percep-
Table 3. Estimates of the spatial autocorrelation parameters
Equation ρ1  ρ2  ρ3  ρ4  ρ5 
ln c  0.265554 0.493288 0.196007 −0.37656 0.180117
SH K  0.634002 −0.14269 0.22608 0.063719 0.010952
SH M  0.587572 −0.05815 0.353718 −0.19113  
Standard errors for estimates in Table 3 are not reported because the significance of the spatial effects has been determined 
through the KR test, as a previous step to the estimation of the ρ’s using GMM.
33. Mean difference of 12.8% and a standard deviation of 4.6%.
34. The 95% confidence interval is [5.98; 21.14%].
35. The 95% confidence interval is [31.21; 34.91%].
36. Our estimate of the average elasticity of variable cost with respect to the stock of public R&D in these states is −5%, lower than 
the −87% estimated in their study.
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Table 4. Own state and social shadow values (Z‾G, F‾ ) and benefits (B‾,B‾*) from agricultural R&D, with stochastic spatial effects 
(Model 2, constant 1949 dollars)
State Z‾G   B‾  F‾  B‾* 
AL 34.9 (5.78) 1.13 (0.052) 123.7 (15.79) 3.99 (0.143)
AR 51.0 (17.07) 1.65 (0.154) 317.0 (40.70) 10.23 (0.368)
AZ 11.6 (3.16) 0.38 (0.029) 198.4 (24.39) 6.4 (0.221)
CA 17.1 (9.41) 0.55 (0.085) 94.4 (12.34) 3.04 (0.112)
CO 21.1 (6.40) 0.68 (0.058) 385.9 (43.37) 12.45 (0.392)
CT 14.4 (2.63) 0.47 (0.024) 12.9 (8.41) 0.42 (0.076)
DE 33.2 (8.90) 1.07 (0.081) 29.9 (12.86) 0.97 (0.116)
FL 22.0 (3.64) 0.71 (0.033) 64.8 (8.56) 2.09 (0.077)
GA 31.5 (6.39) 1.02 (0.058) 159.1 (21.18) 5.13 (0.192)
IA 37.1 (18.19) 1.2 (0.165) 390.4 (46.32) 12.59 (0.419)
ID 31.7 (7.51) 1.02 (0.068) 226.3 (26.90) 7.3 (0.243)
IL 12.3 (8.61) 0.4 (0.078) 358.3 (44.04) 11.56 (0.398)
IN 29.4 (9.13) 0.95 (0.083) 183.1 (24.95) 5.91 (0.226)
KS 62.3 (14.88) 2.01 (0.135) 313.0 (33.41) 10.1 (0.302)
KY 14.3 (9.72) 0.46 (0.088) 350.9 (42.92) 11.32 (0.388)
LA 5.5 (3.25) 0.18 (0.029) 157.3 (19.09) 5.07 (0.173)
MA 22.4 (4.13) 0.72 (0.037) 21.6 (13.30) 0.7 (0.12)
MD 1.9 (1.42) 0.06 (0.013) 55.0 (15.76) 1.78 (0.143)
ME 81.4 (14.80) 2.63 (0.134) 72.0 (15.52) 2.32 (0.14)
MI 30.0 (8.27) 0.97 (0.075) 243.9 (34.21) 7.87 (0.31)
MN 52.2 (14.40) 1.68 (0.13) 313.7 (36.78) 10.12 (0.333)
MO 51.7 (20.58) 1.67 (0.186) 572.3 (63.53) 18.46 (0.575)
MS 17.6 (4.60) 0.57 (0.042) 174.3 (18.59) 5.62 (0.168)
MT 30.0 (5.88) 0.97 (0.053) 231.6 (25.33) 7.47 (0.229)
NC 55.5 (9.75) 1.79 (0.088) 175.1 (19.58) 5.65 (0.177)
ND 30.3 (5.19) 0.98 (0.047) 214.2 (24.12) 6.91 (0.218)
NE 52.4 (14.32) 1.69 (0.13) 525.6 (56.47) 16.96 (0.511)
NH 49.9 (9.32) 1.61 (0.084) 80.6 (13.73) 2.6 (0.124)
NJ 13.0 (2.63) 0.42 (0.024) 16.8 (11.33) 0.54 (0.103)
NM 23.8 (8.07) 0.77 (0.073) 240.0 (30.81) 7.74 (0.279)
NV 6.3 (6.96) 0.2 (0.063) 172.7 (24.64) 5.57 (0.223)
NY 8.6 (3.78) 0.28 (0.034) 20.7 (17.32) 0.67 (0.157)
OH 31.7 (7.86) 1.02 (0.071) 185.9 (26.30) 6.0 (0.238)
OK 30.1 (6.23) 0.97 (0.056) 444.6 (47.68) 14.34 (0.431)
OR 1.6 (7.67) 0.05 (0.069) 143.4 (20.04) 4.63 (0.181)
PA 20.3 (7.56) 0.65 (0.068) 34.1 (19.68) 1.1 (0.178)
RI 12.7 (2.56) 0.41 (0.023) 10.4 (4.96) 0.33 (0.045)
SC 35.9 (4.51) 1.16 (0.041) 96.0 (10.45) 3.1 (0.095)
SD 70.8 (21.84) 2.28 (0.198) 420.0 (49.68) 13.55 (0.449)
TN 34.8 (13.23) 1.12 (0.12) 342.2 (40.86) 11.04 (0.37)
TX 24.2 (11.91) 0.78 (0.108) 168.5 (20.00) 5.44 (0.181)
UT 10.4 (7.20) 0.33 (0.065) 228.5 (26.57) 7.37 (0.24)
VA 34.2 (8.31) 1.1 (0.075) 122.6 (19.00) 3.96 (0.172)
VT 65.1 (13.25) 2.1 (0.12) 58.9 (16.08) 1.9 (0.145)
WA 20.2 (6.84) 0.65 (0.062) 98.6 (11.24) 3.18 (0.102)
WI 28.7 (9.29) 0.93 (0.084) 212.3 (28.65) 6.85 (0.259)
WV 13.5 (6.21) 0.44 (0.056) 80.3 (19.50) 2.59 (0.176)
WY 13.6 (7.01) 0.44 (0.063) 359.4 (41.15) 11.59 (0.372)
(continued)
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tion that these states produce specialty crops that are not 
produced in other areas of the country leading to mini-
mal spillovers. The set of states at the opposite side of 
this spectrum, those with high spillovers are not, except 
for Illinois, ones thought of as major agricultural produc-
ers. This set includes Maryland, Utah, Oklahoma, Colo-
rado, Nevada, Louisiana, Kentucky, Wyoming, Illinois, 
and Oregon. Presumably these states’ public agricul-
tural research is not appropriated fully by each of them 
but they have important positive effects on other states. 
These states have below average own IRRs of 10% but 
important spillover effects of 20%. The states with major 
agricultural sectors lie in the middle of this distribution. 
These state’s own IRRs and spillover rates are higher than 
the average, 19 and 13% respectively. They have been 
able to appropriate their investments as reflected by the 
decrease in their costs of production plus they have fa-
cilitated important productivity improvements in other 
states, presumably those with similar production char-
acteristics. The explanation of these patterns, though not 
the objective of this paper, is deserving of additional re-
search and a natural next step to the analysis here.
Figure 3. Histogram of the own state IRRs (rˆ )—Model 2. Figure 4. Histogram of the social IRRs (rˆ 1)—Model 2.
Table 5. Own state (rˆ ) and social (rˆ 1) IRRs, with stochastic spatial effects (Model 2) 95% confidence intervals in brackets.
State rˆ  rˆ 1  State rˆ  rˆ 1  State rˆ  rˆ 1 
AL 18.01 [15.7; 19.7] 25.91 [24.0; 27.4] MD 2.78 [n/a; 7.2] 20.74 [15.7; 23.6] OR 1.99 [n/a; 13.9] 26.9 [24.7; 28.6]
AR 20.28 [13.9; 23.5] 32.53 [30.4; 34.3] ME 23.18 [20.4; 25.2] 22.4 [18.9; 24.7] PA 14.9 [7.7; 18.1] 17.88 [n/a; 22.5]
AZ 11.88 [7.8; 14.2] 29.14 [27.2; 30.7] MI 17.12 [12.6; 19.7] 30.61 [28.3; 32.4] RI 12.33 [9.6; 14.2] 11.26 [n/a; 14.9]
CA 13.97 [n/a; 18.2] 24.13 [22.2; 25.7] MN 20.42 [15.7; 23.2] 32.45 [30.5; 34.0] SC 18.18 [16.5; 19.5] 24.24 [22.7; 25.5]
CO 15.13 [10.1; 17.8] 34.01 [32.1; 35.6] MO 20.36 [11.4; 24.0] 37.09 [35.1; 38.7] SD 22.3 [16.6; 25.4] 34.66 [32.6; 36.3]
CT 13.04 [10.6; 14.7] 12.42 [n/a; 17.1] MS 14.12 [10.2; 16.5] 28.24 [26.6; 29.6] TN 17.99 [10.1; 21.4] 33.1 [31.1; 34.7]
DE 17.73 [13.4; 20.3] 17.12 [6.7; 20.8] MT 17.12 [14.3; 19.1] 30.24 [28.5; 31.7] TX 15.89 [n/a; 19.9] 28.01 [26.2; 29.5]
FL 15.36 [13.1; 17.0] 21.75 [19.9; 23.2] NC 20.79 [18.2; 22.7] 28.27 [26.5; 29.7] UT 11.27 [n/a; 16.0] 30.14 [28.3; 31.7]
GA 17.41 [14.5; 19.4] 27.61 [25.5; 29.2] ND 17.19 [14.8; 18.9] 29.68 [27.9; 31.1] VA 17.89 [14.1; 20.3] 25.85 [23.4; 27.7]
IA 18.38 [n/a; 22.5] 34.1 [32.1; 35.7] NE 20.44 [15.8; 23.2] 36.41 [34.5; 38.0] VT 21.77 [18.6; 23.9] 21.16 [16.5; 23.9]
ID 17.45 [13.8; 19.7] 30.07 [28.2; 31.6] NH 20.15 [17.4; 22.1] 23.12 [20.5; 25.0] WA 14.89 [8.9; 17.8] 24.42 [22.8; 25.8]
IL 12.19 [n/a; 17.0] 33.44 [31.4; 35.1] NJ 12.46 [9.7; 14.3] 13.86 [n/a; 18.7] WI 16.87 [11.1; 19.8] 29.62 [27.4; 31.3]
IN 17.02 [11.7; 19.9] 28.58 [26.4; 30.3] NM 15.81 [9.7; 18.8] 30.49 [28.4; 32.2] WV 12.69 [0.5; 16.3] 23.1 [19.0; 25.7]
KS 21.5 [17.6; 24.0] 32.43 [30.7; 33.9] NV 8.68 [n/a; 14.9] 28.17 [25.9; 29.9] WY 12.71 [n/a; 16.7] 33.47 [31.5; 35.0]
KY 13 [n/a; 17.8] 33.29 [31.2; 35.0] NY 10.31 [0.3; 13.7] 15.02 [n/a; 20.8] SNA* 15.69 [9.7; 18.8] 26.95 [23.1; 29.1]
LA 7.97 [n/a; 12.0] 27.53 [25.7; 29.0] OH 17.45 [13.6; 19.8] 28.68 [26.4; 30.4] WNA* 16.54 [8.6; 19.8] 29.31 [26.5; 29.3]
MA 15.46 [12.9; 17.3] 15.26 [n/a; 19.9] OK 17.15 [14.1; 19.2] 35.1 [33.3; 36.6]   
n/a: IRR can not be calculated since the corresponding shadow value is negative, SNA simple national average, WNA weighted national average. 
* The bounds of the confidence intervals for the National Averages are calculated as the average of the respective bounds for all states.
Table 4. Continued.
State Z‾G   B‾  F‾  B‾* 
Simple national average 29.25 0.94 197.95 6.39
Simple national SD 18.64 0.60 141.88 4.58
Weighted national average 31.55 (10.48) 1.02 (0.095) 247.4 (30.52) 7.98 (0.276)
Approximated standard errors in parentheses.
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5. Conclusions
The present study is an attempt at providing a quanti-
tative assessment of the returns to public agricultural 
R&D investments in the United States. This is done 
first by deriving the returns to a local public good from 
a theoretical model of firm behavior using the concept 
of virtual prices, then showing how to measure them 
when no information is available on market rates of re-
turn. Our method explicitly acknowledges for the spill-
over effects of these investments by incorporating them 
structurally and stochastically in the model and by al-
lowing endogenous derivation of virtual prices, own 
and social. The objective is to use these estimates in cal-
culating marginal internal rates of return to the use of 
public monies on R&D investments in agriculture. The 
study uses a data set of inputs and outputs developed 
by Craig, Pardey, and Acquaye for specific use in pro-
ductivity analysis combined with R&D stocks built fol-
lowing Evenson’s inverted-V lag structure in a model al-
lowing for spatial stochastic corrections.
The own state internal rate of return we estimate is, on 
average for the nation, 17%. The social internal rate of re-
turn we estimate is, on average, 29%.
Knowledge spillovers are important in agriculture 
and an attempt at capturing all information structurally 
and stochastically should be considered. After adjusting 
for stochastic spatial effects, the estimated returns to ag-
ricultural investments in R&D in the United States are 
fairly high, but lower than estimates for the Midwest by 
Huffman et al. (2002).
Although not a primary focus of this analysis, our 
study has also found that in aggregate US agriculture, 
technical change induced by public agricultural R&D 
has been biased towards the use of capital and pur-
chased inputs and against the use of labor. We also 
found evidence of potential long term impacts of public 
R&D investments on long run growth of the sector.
A number of important shortcomings of this anal-
ysis should be mentioned. First, we know of updated 
data sets for US agriculture being developed by USDA 
and by Alston, Pardey, and colleagues. Presumably 
these would be better to use in the analysis, but the data 
needed for this analysis is not yet available for public 
use. Second, given the growing importance of private 
investments in agricultural R&D, we might err by at-
tributing benefits to public investments that might have 
been the result of private investments. We hope that the 
quality adjustments included by Craig, Pardey, and Ac-
quaye in the painstaking job of constructing the output 
and input indexes are enough to diminish the impact of 
this potential flaw. We would expect that the appropri-
able benefits of private research are embodied in the in-
put aggregates used and therefore effectively captured 
in this study. Similarly, the omission of the extension 
services, the stock of infrastructure, and of international 
spillovers as well as USDA’s intramural research might 
also render our estimates upward biased. Third, our 
analysis is static, and assumes naïve expectation forma-
tion in production and decision making, all these com-
promising our estimates.
All in all, even if we provide estimates of the rate 
of return to public R&D in agriculture lower than pre-
viously suggested, an average return of 29% on public 
funds is still impressive compared to the 9 and 12% av-
erage returns of the S&P500 and NASDAQ composite 
indexes during the same period.
Acknowledgments — We thank the support provided by the 
Nebraska Agricultural Experiment Station in the form of a re-
search assistantship for Dr. Plastina during his graduate work 
at UNL. In particular, we thank Dr. Darrell Nelson, Dean of 
Agricultural Research and Director of the Nebraska Agricul-
tural Experiment Station (1988–2005), University of Nebraska-
Lincoln, for his personal interest and support on this project. 
In particular his intervention was crucial in obtaining the data 
on public R&D expenditures. We also thank the support re-
ceived from the late Dr. Catherine Morrison-Paul.
Figure 5. Own state IRRs to public agricultural R&D—Model 
2. References: White r  =  0–10%; Gray r  =  10–20%; Black 
r > 20%.
Figure 6. Social IRRs to public agricultural R&D expendi-
tures—Model 2. References: White r  =  10–20%; Gray r  =  20–
30%; Black r > 30%.
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Appendix 2: Model 1, no SAR error structure
Method of estimation: ITSUR.




Number of Iterations: 50.
Final Convergence Criteria: CONVERGE  =  0.001  
    Criteria Met.
Observations Processed: 2064.
Equation DF model DF error R2  Adj. R2  AIC
ln c  83.11 1,981 0.8084 0.8004 0.24942
SHM  17.94 2,046 0.9376 0.9371 0.001031
SHK  17.94 2,046 0.8034 0.8017 0.000985
System R2: 0.896487
Appendix 1: Descriptive statistics
Table 6. Descriptive statistics of the variables pooled through time and states.
Variable Units N Mean SD Minimum Maximum
Output quantity (1949  =  100) 2,064 145.51 55.88 62.65 418.68
Land quantity (1949  =  100) 2,064 84.56 20.34 23.63 122.88
Labor quantity (1949  =  100) 2,064 59.49 21.22 16.68 100.99
Capital quantity (1949  =  100) 2,064 121.47 33.32 40.72 302.30
Purchased inputs quantity (1949  =  100) 2,064 179.36 85.60 39.08 562.24
Expenditures on land in 1949 $1,000 48 132,515 116,648 2,119 529,117
Expenditures on labor in 1949 $1,000 48 303,343 217,003 11,909 931,771
Expenditures on capital in 1949 $1,000 48 177,403 143,910 8,546 526,525
Expenditures on purchased inputs in 1949 $1,000 48 140,533 115,487 8,641 534,242
Total Value of agricultural output in 1949 $1,000 48 620,240 566,447 21,858 2,399,574
Source: Acquaye et al. (2003)
Table 7. Descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analysis pooled through time and states.
Variable Units N Mean SD Minimum Maximum
wM  (1949  =  100) 2,064 201 117 94 593
wL  (1949  =  100) 2,064 446 328 95 1,415
wK  (1949  =  100) 2,064 207 115 84 483
SHM  Proportion of the variable cost 2,064 0.3882 0.1182 0.1455 0.8195
SHL  Proportion of the variable cost 2,064 0.2810 0.0986 0.0623 0.6594
SHK  Proportion of the variable cost 2,064 0.3307 0.0651 0.1182 0.5300
T  $1,000 (constant 1949 dollars) 2,064 122,989 118,897 587 532,774
y  $1,000 (constant 1949 dollars) 2,064 920,314 905,341 14,694 5,631,427
G  $1,000 (constant 1949 dollars) 2,064 1,729 1,943 99 16,624
S  $1,000 (constant 1949 dollars) 2,064 7,649 5,979 138 31,426
c  $1,000 (constant 1949 dollars) 2,064 664,066 545,272 10,702 3,183,774
Sources G and S are based on author’s calculations. All other variables are from Acquaye et al. (2003).
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Appendix 3: Model 2, with SAR error structure
Method of estimation: ITSUR.




Number of Iterations: 41.
Final Convergence Criteria: CONVERGE  =  0.001  
    Criteria Met.
Observations Processed: 2064.
Parameter estimates
Parameter Estimate SE T-value Parameter Estimate SE T-value
δ T  1.661054 0.1796 9.25 β KY  −0.03839 0.00509 −7.54
δ Y  −1.03266 0.2336 −4.42 β TY  0.144139 0.0386 3.73
δ G  0.439636 0.2601 1.69 β MG  0.009626 0.00415 2.32
β MK  0.067766 0.00568 11.93 β LG  −0.01025 0.00386 −2.65
β MT  −0.01813 0.00601 −3.02 β KG  0.000619 0.00377 0.16
β MY  0.124598 0.00561 22.21 β TG  0.014571 0.0281 0.52
β LK  0.037924 0.00415 9.14 β YG  −0.09133 0.0463 −1.97
β LT  0.068861 0.00575 11.98 β GS  −0.24097 0.021 −11.46
β LY  −0.08621 0.0052 −16.56 β ML  0.081212 0.00325 24.98
β LL  −0.11914 0.00352 −33.87 β MS  0.034992 0.00415 8.43
β MM  −0.14898 0.00501 −29.71 β LS  −0.03773 0.00387 −9.75
β KK  −0.10569 0.00835 −12.66 β KS  0.002742 0.00388 0.71
β TT  −0.19386 0.0293 −6.62 β TS  −0.16861 0.0162 −10.39
β YY  −0.07296 0.0644 −1.13 β GG  0.31271 0.0374 8.35
β KT  −0.05074 0.00559 −9.07 β YS  0.239682 0.0181 13.25
Parameters estimates of dummy variables are not reported but can be obtained from the authors.
Equation DF model DF error R2  Adj. R2  AIC
ln c*  83.11 1,981 0.9324 0.9296 0.06615
SHM *  17.94 2,046 0.926 0.9254 0.000611
SHK *  17.94 2,046 0.8904 0.8895 0.000418
System R2: 0.911236
* Transformed variables
Parameter Estimate SE T-value Parameter Estimate SE T-value
δ T  1.007875 0.1101 9.15 β KY  −0.05499 0.00384 −14.33
δ Y  −0.35228 0.1432 −2.46 β TY  −0.07576 0.0204 −3.71
δ G  −0.40512 0.1617 −2.51 β MG  0.013477 0.00299 4.51
β MK  0.074332 0.00888 8.37 β LG  −0.01807 0.0026 −6.95
β MT  −0.03649 0.00736 −4.96 β KG  0.004589 0.0026 1.77
β MY  0.135337 0.00451 30.02 β TG  0.035987 0.0166 2.17
β LK  0.070494 0.00739 9.54 β YG  −0.04832 0.0268 −1.80
β LT  0.076869 0.00634 12.12 β GS  0.035599 0.0132 2.69
β LY  −0.08035 0.00378 −21.25 β ML  0.058759 0.0058 10.14
β LL  −0.12925 0.0072 −17.95 β MS  0.040074 0.00347 11.54
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